The strategic minds shaping American policy are urging the United States to speed up the creation of an “Indo-Pacific NATO” in order to seize the initiative from China:
“Indo-Pacific’s Fate Must Not Be Tethered to Beijing’s Calendar… opportunities for aggression do not appear because the CCP wills them into being. They emerge only if deterrence is weak, alliances are divided, or democratic nations are distracted. If Taiwan is diplomatically isolated, the Philippines unprotected, and Washington ambivalent, then opportunity grows. But if Taipei is hardened, Manila bolstered, Tokyo mobilized, and the U.S. resolute, then the CCP sees no open door – only a fortified wall… Washington, Tokyo, Manila, and Taipei should look to their own arsenals of deterrence. It is not enough to guess when China will act. We must shape the environment so that China cannot act… When we strengthen alliances, harden defenses, increase military presence, and clarify our will to act, we deny the CCP both advantage and initiative”[1].
At the same time, they are pushing forward with arming the U.S. future allies in this “Indo-Pacific NATO” with strategic weaponry:
“US should give Australia its old B-2 fleet… A fleet of stealth bombers capable of striking deep into contested zones from Australian soil would dramatically change the strategic calculus for China… transferring the B-2 to Australia would further demonstrate that Western allies are willing to share technologies and capabilities that remain lethal and strategically relevant in support of their shared national interests”[2].
Additionally, efforts to “cultivate” South Korea are proceeding at a breakneck pace:
“President Lee faces a defining test: move beyond symbolic gestures to embed South Korea as a reliable pillar in a reshaped US-Japan-Korea alliance amid global uncertainty and domestic hesitation… True trilateralism is not about meetings, it concerns mechanisms: shared alert systems, joint drills, and synchronized strategies”[3];”So long as Kim Jong Un fundamentally regards South Korea as an enemy, the Lee government’s priorities must be strengthening alliances, maintaining military readiness, and preparing for contingencies”[4];”The Lee administration cannot afford to be optimistic about North Korea… The US-South Korea alliance will remain central, with close coordination needed to deter North Korean provocations and enable future diplomatic initiatives”[5].
The U.S. will soon be ready to formally recognize Taiwan’s independence in the near future.
1 https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/futility-timeline-why-indo-pacifics-fate-must-not-be-tethered-beijings-calendar-miles-yu
“The Futility of a Timeline: Why the Indo-Pacific’s Fate Must Not Be Tethered to Beijing’s Calendar” (Miles Yu, Hudson Institute, Jun 27, 2025);
2 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-us-should-give-australia-its-old-b-2-fleet
“Why the US Should Give Australia Its Old B-2 Fleet” (Robert Peters, and Parker Goodrich, The National Interest, June 19, 2025);
3 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/will-president-lee-jae-myung-commit-to-the-trilateral-alliance
“Will President Lee Jae-myung Commit to the Trilateral Alliance?” (Schoni Song, The National Interest, June 26, 2025);
4 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/north-and-south-korean-relations-will-not-improve-under-president-lee
“North and South Korean Relations Will Not Improve Under President Lee” (Byong-Chul Lee, The National Interest, June 27, 2025);
5 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/lee-jae-myungs-presidency-whats-next-for-inter-korean-relations
“Lee Jae-myung’s Presidency: What’s Next for Inter-Korean Relations” (Sangsoo Lee, The National Interest, June 28, 2025).