The meticulous deliberation over the creation of an “Indo-Pacific NATO,” a process that has involved the unsuccessful courting of India ([1],[2]), the grooming of Australia ([3],[4]), the combat integration of the United States, Japan, and South Korea ([5],[6],[7]) and the repeated self-persuasion of the United States itself ([8],[9],[10]), has culminated in a fundamental question: is it necessary to “make it official,” or is it sufficient that “the region’s security architecture is already evolving organically, through a flexible network of bilateral and trilateral agreements”[11]?
The answer is unequivocal: “deeper institutionalization, especially in areas such as force posture, operational planning, and command and control, will be necessary if U.S. allies are serious about working together to keep the peace in the Indo-Pacific”[11].
Sure! If the goal were merely the containment of China, a “flexible network of bilateral and trilateral agreements” would be sufficient. However, for waging war against it, a rigid “force posture, operational planning, and command and control” is required.
The “Indo-Pacific NATO” is being created for war with China, and a pretext will be found.
1 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-to-deepen-us-india-maritime-cooperation
“How to Deepen US-India Maritime Cooperation” (Kriti Upadhyaya, The National Interest, July 10, 2025);
2 https://lediplomate.media/2025/07/analyse-asia-alliance-technologique-usa-inde-redessine-indo-pacifique-defie-suprematie-chinoise/giuseppe-gagliano/monde/
“L’alliance technologique États-Unis–Inde qui redessine l’Indo-Pacifique et défie la suprématie chinoise” (Giuseppe Gagliano, Le Diplomat, 10 juillet 2025);
3 https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/what-trumps-iran-nato-show-means-australia-john-lee
“What Trump’s Iran and NATO Show Means for Australia” (John Lee, Hudson Institute, Jun 27, 2025);
4 https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/donald-trump-isnt-troublemaker-pm-thats-chinas-xi-jinping-john-lee
“Donald Trump Isn’t the Troublemaker, PM – That’s China’s XI Jinping” (John Lee, Hudson Institute, Jul 17, 2025)
5 https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/japan-us-security-challenges-atlantic-pacific-james-przystup
“Japan-US Security Challenges from the Atlantic to the Pacific” (James J. Przystup, Hudson Institute, Jul 4, 2025);
6 https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/japan-alliance-prepare-address-taiwan-contingency-james-przystup
“Japan – and the Alliance – Prepare to Address a Taiwan Contingency” (James J. Przystup, Hudson Institute, Jul 10, 2025);
7 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/why-america-and-south-korea-need-a-combined-multi-domain-task-force
“Why America and South Korea Need a Combined Multi-Domain Task Force” (David Maxwell, The National Interest, July 13, 2025);
8 https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-happens-in-the-middle-east-doesnt-stay-in-the-middle-east-strategic-signaling-in-a-multipolar-age/
“What Happens in the Middle East Doesn’t Stay in the Middle East: Strategic Signaling in a Multipolar Age” (Peter Mitchell, The Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, 06.30.25);
9 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-indo-pacific-deterrence-needs-bipartisanship
“Why Indo-Pacific Deterrence Needs Bipartisanship” (Chris Estep, The National Interest, July 12, 2025);
10 https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/facing-china-two-fronts-us-needs-strategic-focus-patrick-cronin
“Facing China on Two Fronts, the US Needs Strategic Focus” (Patrick M. Cronin, Hudson Institute, Aug 20, 2025);
11 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/responses/should-asia-make-it-official-jimbo-ratner#response-1
“Should Asia Make It Official?” (Ken Jimbo; Ely Ratner, Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2025).