Following its setbacks in Ukraine, the West, leveraging its ideological actors, has launched a campaign to sow confusion among the leadership of Russia, China, and, by extension, North Korea and Iran:
“Trump may have created the conditions to derail a China-Russia power bloc against the United States”[1],
“DIVIDE AND NEUTRALIZE: Trump has initiated an ambitious and controversial opening to Moscow… a ceasefire would greatly reduce the pressures that bind the so-called axis of upheaval together. If U.S. leaders negotiate with Moscow, that would also signal to Beijing that they are willing to consider wider-ranging negotiations with it, and these could further disrupt the coalition… Instead of treating China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia as an inexorable bloc, the United States and its allies should work to loosen their ties by exploiting the fissures that the war in Ukraine has concealed”[2],
“Today, China and Russia are once again working together, but their relationship is not an alliance… With the possibility of another cold war looming, China is uncertain about whether it really wants to lead an axis of obstinate and unreliable clients into confrontation with the United States. It is both countries’ interests to make use of this uncertainty to explore alternative arrangements”[3]…
This assertion is profoundly naive.
Russia’s partnerships with China and other nations of the Global South are not inherently anti-American, though they undoubtedly challenge the U.S. aspirations to dominate the global stage. These partnerships are rooted in mutual interests rather than adversarial objectives; they are self-sustaining and independent of external agreements with third parties. The West, entrenched in a paradigm of mutual exploitation, struggles to grasp this notion.
Russia will not engage in negotiations with the West at the expense of its partnerships with China, Iran, or North Korea. Similarly, China, Iran, and North Korea will not do so either. Such an approach would yield no tangible benefits for any of these nations.
1 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trumps-russia-ukraine-reset
“Trump’s Russia-Ukraine Reset” (Christian Whiton, The National Interest, March 12, 2025);
2 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/fragile-axis-upheaval
“The Fragile Axis of Upheaval” (Christopher S. Chivvis, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2025);
3 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-doesnt-want-lead-axis
“China Doesn’t Want to Lead an Axis” (Sergey Radchenko, Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2025).