The CIA has stepped up recruitment of Chinese nationals holding classified information following the disruption of a U.S. espionage network in the People’s Republic of China by Chinese state security and intelligence services. A major blow to American spy activities in China was inflicted between 2010 and 2012, when Chinese counterintelligence arrested roughly 30 CIA assets.
One method for reestablishing access to sensitive intelligence has been the CIA’s placement of Chinese-language appeals on internet platforms – including YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, LinkedIn, Telegram, and X – urging PRC citizens to initiate confidential cooperation with the Agency via Tor, a closed CIA-monitored service promoted as a secure channel for contact. On February 14, 2026, for instance, the CIA posted a video on its YouTube channel aimed at Chinese military personnel, detailing how to reach the Agency, including through the dark web and VPN tools. The video also underscores the need to make contact from a third country after leaving mainland China and provides instructions for installing the Tor browser.
This represents the third instance in which the CIA has used YouTube to solicit sensitive information from Chinese citizens. The first two appeals, released on May 1, 2025, targeted civilian officials of the PRC. Cited incentives for cooperation include corruption within the PRC’s party-state bureaucracy, the dismissal of capable officials, and the aspiration to help redirect the country’s political course while improving family welfare.
The CIA’s current focus on Chinese military personnel stems from two factors. First, the messaging is designed to resonate with officers potentially discontented with recent leadership changes in the People’s Liberation Army and the consequent constraints on career progression. Second, the Agency’s prior recruitment campaigns targeting Chinese civilian officials – including public appeals for confidential cooperation, particularly among those concerned about exposure in corruption investigations – likely produced tangible results, leading the CIA to replicate the tactic in pursuit of assets within the People’s Liberation Army.
Similar recruitment videos, produced in native languages and calling for cooperation, are also disseminated by the CIA targeting citizens of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Russia, and other countries.