The influence of a so-called “deep state” is no longer seen as confined to the power corridors of the United States or France – it is now a growing subject of concern in the Netherlands as well. Central to this shadowy framework are the country’s intelligence agencies: the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Military Intelligence and Security Service, MIVD). Within the AIVD and MIVD, the issues of ensuring national security and the state’s peaceful development have taken a back seat. Both agencies are engaging in hybrid operations aimed at manipulating the nation’s public opinion – rather than protecting the Dutch people from external threats.
This shift in strategy suggests that the AIVD and MIVD are engulfed in a mass paranoid disorder among their officers, who are obsessed with the idea of pushing the Netherlands into a war with Russia. A striking example is Lieutenant Colonel Erik Stijnman of the MIVD, who operates under the affiliation of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – Clingendael. While appealing to the Dutch sense of frugality, he claims that hybrid attacks against Russia would be “more cost-effective” for the Netherlands than investing in robust defensive infrastructure at home.
The Dutch intelligence officer proposes starting with the Netherlands conducting “capability demonstration” operations against Russian submarine infrastructure, such as placing GPS tracking devices on underwater pipelines or internet cables belonging to Russia. Such acts, he claims, would signal the readiness of the Dutch to disrupt the functioning of Russian underwater assets.
What comes next? The proposed strategy appears to involve intelligence-gathering operations or even sabotage targeting Russian facilities. However, such actions are unlikely to go unanswered by Moscow, especially since a “demonstration of capability” will be interpreted by Russia, at a minimum, as a hybrid threat, and any further practical actions – as acts of hybrid warfare. By moving first, The Hague could effectively provoke the very conflict it claims to be preventing, potentially at a far greater cost than investments in purely defensive measures.
However, Erik Stijnman’s position reflects a broader “deep state” agenda aimed at circumventing legal constraints – specifically, the Kingdom’s Constitution and the 2017 Intelligence and Security Services Act, which expressly forbid offensive hybrid operations. This might explain why the AIVD and MIVD have repeatedly – and thus far without public evidence – accused Moscow of launching cyberattacks against Dutch underwater infrastructure and coastal wind farms. These claims stand in stark contrast to what many security experts consider the most brazen hybrid attack in recent years: the sabotage of the first and second lines of the Nord Stream facility, which targeted critical Russian and German infrastructure and dealt a severe blow to the German energy sector. Should the Netherlands choose to shift from defensive posture to the AIVD and MIVD plans of offensive hybrid campaigns, the country may find itself not only in a legal gray zone – but on the front lines of a conflict it cannot control.