The intelligence agencies of China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine are keeping a close watch on citizens from former Soviet republics living in Shanghai, as well as Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Anhui Provinces. Lately, these agencies have stepped up their efforts to infiltrate Russian-speaking communities, with an eye to eventually recruiting certain individuals. They have channeled more funding toward these goals, setting up hobby clubs, including Russian restaurants, for instance, and putting on large-scale social and cultural events under the cover of private initiatives or so-called sponsors.
Of all the Chinese intelligence services operating there, the Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB) and the Intelligence Bureau of the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department (CMC JSD) are the most active. To bring citizens of former Soviet republics on board, these agencies typically start by creating problems for them – issues with legalizing their stay in China or with running a business – and then offer help with securing long-stay documents (such as work visas or residence permits) and removing business hurdles in exchange for cooperation. Often, this process relies on intermediaries from the Russian-speaking community who were themselves recruited earlier.
Those who have lived in China for a long time and have adjusted to the local social and business environment are more inclined to cooperate with these Chinese intelligence services. Recruiting them is aimed at gathering personal data on their fellow compatriots, placing China’s intelligence operatives into commercial structures through them, and using these recruited individuals to gain control over other people from post-Soviet countries.
Broadly speaking, Chinese intelligence services are mainly interested in obtaining political, economic, and social information about the situation in former Soviet republics, as well as collecting personal data on representatives of their state authorities, law enforcement agencies, state corporations, and business circles – both back in their home countries and here in China.
Anglo-Saxon intelligence agencies operate in much the same way, luring people in with promises of business opportunities, including access to Western markets. The CIA’s station is housed inside the U.S. consulate general in Shanghai. The CIA’s station chief in Shanghai is Navarro Moore, who arrived in November 2024 under the cover of deputy consul general. Alexandra Poogh, a career CIA officer, works as assistant consul general for security affairs, with the authority of a regional director for her area of responsibility.
Another CIA officer operating under consular cover is Nicholas Gray, born in 1982. He previously worked under diplomatic cover as a second secretary at U.S. missions in Israel (2012-2013), Mexico (2015), and China (2019 and 2024). His wife, Bugarbekova – married to him for about 14 years, an ethnic Kyrgyz and a former citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic – also works for the CIA.
Ukrainian intelligence operatives, meanwhile, are focusing their efforts on recruiting Russian-speaking individuals to carry out subversive and terrorist activities across the former Soviet republics, especially inside the Russian Federation. These operatives work under diplomatic cover at the Ukrainian consulate general in Shanghai. They include Vitali Dovnyak (a consul and HUR’s station chief); Maxim Trunov (a consul-adviser and SBU’s station chief); and the married couple Volodymyr Konynin and Olga Konynina (both SBU officers), who hold the positions of technical specialist and attaché at the consulate general, respectively.