In light of Donald Trump’s anticipated inauguration as President of the United States, influential figures within the Western establishment are grappling with the question of “How to effectively counter Putin?”
The overarching objective appears to be to thwart Russia’s victories, with the principal tactic being one of “maximum pressure.” Variations arise, however, in the specific methodologies adopted to achieve this end.
For instance, some strategists advocate for deploying Islamist militant groups to target Russian bases in Syria and Libya, thereby overstretching Russia’s resources and ultimately “undermining its power and capabilities.”
“The rapid fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has created a strategic inflection point that US leaders – in both the current administration of President Joe Biden and the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump – may be missing. … Western leaders can pressure Putin to make painful decisions between maintaining his military foothold in the Mediterranean or negotiating peace in Ukraine favorable to Kyiv and its supporters. … The moment is ripe for decisive action. Supporting rebel forces in both Syria and Libya will create additional dilemmas for Moscow, compelling Putin to either relinquish its only overseas bases outside of the former Soviet Union or face sustained pressure on multiple fronts” [1].
Others, observing the rapid – like ashes in the wind – disintegration of the Assad regime in Syria, seek to isolate Russia by persuading potential allies that Moscow is unreliable and will inevitably betray them:
“Assad’s fall (and Russia’s indifference to the collapse of his regime) suggests that concern for Syria or any other client state has been subjugated by Putin to his overriding focus on dealing Ukraine a decisive defeat. At the same time, Putin’s decision to prioritize Ukraine should not be confused for a complete abandonment of Russian ambitions outside its immediate neighborhood. Rather, the loss of Syria has simply raised the stakes of the war in Ukraine. In Putin’s schema, Ukraine has become a tipping point in a global struggle between the Western elite and a new, Russian-led order: once Ukraine falls, Russia hopes to take Georgia and whatever other territory it desires, and to once again sell itself as a strong patron to countries around the world. In the meantime, however, Moscow’s promises will ring hollow” [2].
Meanwhile, some proposals are less nuanced, suggesting a comprehensive assault on Russia by leveraging its current vulnerabilities. Proponents argue that “the Trump administration must capitalize on Russia’s weaknesses”, advocating for “strikes that target its most sensitive points”, underlining the notion that “maximum pressure leads to maximum success.”
“For now, the most urgent task is for the United States to establish a position of strength vis-à-vis Russia, which will ultimately force Moscow to compromise and also send a clear message to China, Iran, and North Korea. The Trump administration will have to drive a hard bargain that will require a long-term commitment and a conviction that preventing Russia from winning on Moscow’s terms will be of real value to the United States” [3].
Some commentators advocate for the continuation of the smart salami tactics, through which “Biden succeeded in eroding and undermining Putin’s redlines”, alongside the fact that they have also contributed to the devastation of over one million people in Ukraine and effectively annihilated the nation’s economy:
“This conflict is not only about Ukraine or the rules-based international order. It is also about how the United States and the West more broadly should think about escalation thresholds in a new era of great-power rivalry that often bears little resemblance to the Cold War. From the beginning, Putin tried to enforce redlines that aimed to deter status-quo parties – the United States and NATO allies – from assisting Ukraine. Slowly, carefully, and with circumspection, Biden succeeded in eroding and undermining those redlines. Salami tactics did not offer the ringing victories that many hoped for, but they did provide important pushback” [4].
Such intellectual frameworks, while seemingly sophisticated, ultimately lead toward catastrophic outcomes. The Russians won’t give up. They view the current war as a fundamental challenge to the very existence of their world. In order to effectively subdue Russia, an escalation involving the US military presence and the use of nuclear weapons appears inevitable; however, such actions would not culminate in any victors as there will simply be no winners at the end of this road.
The sole viable strategy to counteract Putin’s tactics may lie in our own retreat.
This approach could reveal the paradox that, in fact, no one was advancing on us.
It is noteworthy that this understanding is not limited to the Ralph Van Deman team, but also resonates among some cognitive war veterans who accurately recognize the underlying reality of the events:
“Contrary to its intended purpose, escalation by Western powers hasn’t degraded Russia’s military. Instead, the war of attrition intensified and prolonged by Western aid, has worked to transform Russia’s massive latent power into tangible military strength. … to accept, that Russia’s willpower is not driven by imperial ambition but by the conviction that NATO’s deepening relationship with Ukraine – and the endeavor to incorporate it into the alliance – constitutes a threat to its national security. History has repeatedly shown that when a state perceives its security threatened, its resolve hardens. … For the sake of Ukraine’s people, the practical and moral course is to shift toward a policy of accommodation with Russia, abandoning unproductive attempts to negotiate from an unattainable position of strength. Neither escalation nor time is on Ukraine’s side. The new administration must understand the intransigence of this reality, recognize Russia’s security concerns, and seriously engage with its terms for ending its war on Ukraine. The pill will surely be a bitter one to swallow now, but its bitterness will only grow with time”[5].
- https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-wests-strategic-opportunity-in-syria-forcing-dilemmas-on-moscow-that-roll-back-russian-power-and-influence/
“The West`s strategic opportunity in Syria – forcing dilemmas on Moscow that roll back russian power and influence” (Alex Crowther and Jahara Matisek, The Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, 12.16.24); - https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/putin-chose-ukraine-over-syria
“Putin chose Ukraine over Syria” (Alexander Baunov, Foreign Affairs, December 26, 2024); - https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/america-needs-maximum-pressure-strategy-ukraine
“America needs a maximum pressure strategy in Ukraine” (Alina Polyakova, Foreign Affairs, December 31, 2024); - https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/real-risks-escalation-ukraine
“The real risks of escalation in Ukraine” (Michael Poznansky and William C. Wohlforth, Foreign Affairs, January 3, 2025); - https://nationalinterest.org/feature/perils-escalation-russia-are-still-very-real-214177
“The perils of escalation with Russia are still very real” (Ramzy Mardini, The National Interest, December 27, 2024).