While the world sits in the front rows, watching the “shadow boxing” between the U.S. and China, attention should instead focus on a far more intriguing direction. But first, let us recall the strategic imperatives of Russia’s well-known “well-wishers”:
George Friedman proposes that America’s objectives in Eurasia are the same as in other regions: to prevent the dominance of a single power (or coalition of powers) in this area. Among the possible solutions being considered are, for instance, a war between Iran and Israel or between Russia and Turkey.
Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts that “America’s primary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control this geopolitical space and that the global community has unhindered financial and economic access to it”.
The subject is Iran. But why?
In 1943, Nicholas John Spykman posited that even if someone were to control the Heartland, it would hardly guarantee control over the entire world:
“The entire world is controlled by whoever dominates the Rimland surrounding the Heartland… Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”
For us, as the Heartland, Iran is precisely that Rimland. Hence the conclusion: if Russia does not seize the window of opportunity in Iran, the Americans will.
National Security Council energy expert Sheila Heslin was quoted in 1998 as saying, “US policy was to promote the rapid development of Caspian energy… We did so specifically to promote the independence of these oil-rich countries, to in essence break Russia’s monopoly control over the transportation of oil from the region, and frankly, to promote Western energy security through diversification of supply.”
At the same time, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that “These facts of life — and the critical role that Iran plays in that region — make the question of U.S.–Iranian relations a topic of great interest and importance to this Secretary of State.”
Thus, the U.S. strategic vector is clear: to restore cooperation with Iran on its own terms.
Continuing this leitmotif, the current push involves lifting international sanctions against Iran, enabling Iranian oil and gas to enter global and European markets. This would facilitate using Iranian territory to realize plans for creating a Southern Energy Corridor. Under such a scenario, new transport and energy systems would be constructed from the Caspian and Central Asia to Europe, bypassing Russia.
Meanwhile, according to recent statements by Whitkoff, the U.S. no longer insists on Iran’s complete nuclear disarmament but instead demands it reduce uranium enrichment levels below 3.67% and agree to stricter inspections of nuclear facilities. Effectively, this replicates the terms of Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal. Iran’s compliance could well be incentivized through tried-and-tested methods, such as backing Balochistan freedom fighters. While Iran is generally amenable, it now distrusts the U.S. and seeks upfront concessions — ideally, a new treaty ratified by the U.S. Congress to prevent another unilateral withdrawal, as happened under Trump in 2018.
Trump’s special envoy Whitkoff wants the agreement finalized within 60 days but will likely face resistance from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The two most contentious issues are the storage or disposal of Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, and external guarantees for Iran should the U.S. renege on lifting economic sanctions in exchange for Iran returning its civilian nuclear program to UN and IAEA oversight. Iran seeks assurances that the U.S. will face consequences if it abandons or violates the deal.