{"id":1112,"date":"2024-10-28T04:02:29","date_gmt":"2024-10-28T09:02:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/ru\/?p=1112"},"modified":"2024-10-28T06:16:35","modified_gmt":"2024-10-28T11:16:35","slug":"nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/","title":{"rendered":"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win? "},"content":{"rendered":"

The National Interest, a prominent US think-tank, has raised in a timely fashion the critical issue of how to coexist with Russia after the Ukraine conflict:<\/p>\n

starting with<\/em> “Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia has long been perceived as a significant military threat, but its recent failures, especially in Ukraine, reveal a weaker reality. Despite bluster and aggressive tactics, Russia\u2019s hybrid warfare \u2014 combining conventional and unconventional means \u2014 has consistently fallen short. \u2026 Will Russia recover and be a threat to NATO? \u2026 The real choice is with NATO; pay attention to the paper tiger at the border, roaring for attention. Or continuing to support NATO member nations in the deterrence of unwanted aggression by those who do not hold any value to sovereignty that does not advance the failed Russian empire”1<\/sup>;<\/p>\n

through<\/em> “Once the artillery and glide bombs stop falling in Ukraine, Russia will still pose a significant threat to the West and, of course, NATO. How much of a threat depends upon how the war ends. \u2026 When the fighting stops Russia will retain a sizeable population, albeit with deep demographic issues, substantial capabilities, and most damningly, an unbridled imperial mindset. \u2026 Russia is very likely to remain a clear threat to the U.S. and its allies. The level of threat can, however, be reduced, if Russia is handed a strategic defeat in Ukraine. Anything less, and the Kremlin will be emboldened. \u2026 There is still time to hand Russia a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but the hour grows later by the day”2<\/sup>;<\/p>\n

and finally<\/em> “After the Ukraine Conflict, Competitive Coexistence is the Best Option:<\/strong> Being a great power lies at the center of Russian national identity. \u2026 To preserve or reassert its standing as a great power and guarantee its security, post-conflict Russia will almost certainly seek to push the military threat it sees emanating from Europe as far away from its border as possible. \u2026  The inevitable tension does not, however, doom the United States and NATO to an intense adversarial relationship with Russia, forever teetering on the brink of direct military confrontation. Mutually-agreed coexistence is possible, even if it will be competitive. Achieving that end-state will require the United States and NATO to balance deterrence and diplomacy, containment and engagement, in their Russia policy.<\/p>\n

While maintaining a strong deterrent posture, NATO members should restore normal diplomatic relations with Russia to engage in shared interests, such as climate change, and manage ongoing disputes over, for example, security arrangements. NATO members should gradually ease sanctions to permit the restoration of mutually beneficial commercial activity and people-to-people exchanges. They should even allow Russia to reenter energy markets, as long as guardrails against excessive dependence are put in place. Further, NATO members should pursue arms control measures, akin to those signed as the Cold War faded away, to ease tensions along the frontier”3<\/sup>.<\/p>\n

Notably, these narratives were delivered in a simultaneous, clearly sequential manner \u2014 progressing from the most caricatured and absurd concept of “Russia\u2019s paper tiger military: Why NATO shouldn\u2019t fear Putin”, through the doomily hawkish “Russia\u2019s imperial ambitions: The long-term threat to NATO” and culminating with more rational perspectives of “NATO vs. Russia: How to ensure conflict is avoided”.<\/p>\n

This sequence does not reflect a true contest of concepts:<\/p>\n

the initial narrative clearly lacks substantial backing. While it is accurate to acknowledge the failures and miscalculations of the Russians that occurred at the outset of the military operation in Ukraine, claiming that Russia is “a paper tiger”, “a mouse hiding behind an effigy of a menacing threat of what is a sweet and cuddly teddy bear”, which therefore should be fearlessly attacked and smashed, amounts to unfounded self-aggrandizement and only invites unnecessary verbal contention;<\/p>\n

the second narrative, despite concluding with the phrase “There is still time to hand Russia a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but the hour grows later by the day” presents a significantly more unbiased evaluation of Russia\u2019s capabilities. It is offering a more balanced perspective grounded in the insight of NATO SACEUR General Christopher G. Cavoli: “At the end of the war in Ukraine, no matter how it looks, the Russian army will be stronger than it is today. These forces will be on the border of our alliance. They are commanded by the same people who already see us as enemies and will later be dissatisfied with the way the war went. So we will have an opponent with real skills, a mass of troops, and clear intentions”2<\/sup>;<\/p>\n

yet the third narrative – with a broader, albeit hostile-to-Russia justification for the fact that “after the Ukraine conflict, competitive coexistence is the best option” is a no-nonsense discussion and to the point.<\/p>\n

This is more likely a preparation for the transition from war to peace, which is encouraging.<\/p>\n

Naturally, all the three narratives are based on the fallacy of the “unbridled imperial mindset” of the Russians \u2013 while an impartial look at the establishment of the Russian state reveals that the Russians have never been driven by any desire to enslave their neighbors; on the contrary, Russia has never been a colonial empire. The only desire behind that ground gaining was to reach defensible frontiers to repel invasions from both the forests of Europe and the steppes of Asia. Russia is not great for the sake of greatness; its immensity is a means of defense and security. A proper understanding of this fact is crucial.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the proposal of a roadmap for coexistence, though a \u201ccompetitive\u201d one, and albeit by think-tankers, is a chance for de-escalation.<\/p>\n

Moreover, you don\u2019t have to wait for “an opponent with real skills, a mass of troops, and clear intentions” to appear on your borders. The third narrative approach can be put into action now, before the defeat of Ukraine.<\/p>\n

1<\/sup> https:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/feature\/russia%E2%80%99s-paper-tiger-military-why-nato-shouldn%E2%80%99t-fear-putin-213323<\/a><\/p>\n

“Russia\u2019s Paper Tiger Military: Why NATO Shouldn\u2019t Fear Putin” (Brandon Valeriano,<\/a> Ryan C. Maness<\/a>, The National Interest, October 22, 2024);<\/p>\n

2<\/sup> https:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/feature\/russia%E2%80%99s-imperial-ambitions-long-term-threat-nato-213332<\/a><\/p>\n

“Russia\u2019s Imperial Ambitions: The Long-Term Threat to NATO” (Daniel Kochis<\/a>, The National Interest October 23, 2024);<\/p>\n

3<\/sup> https:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/blog\/buzz\/nato-vs-russia-how-ensure-conflict-avoided-213337<\/a><\/p>\n

“NATO vs. Russia: How to Ensure Conflict Is Avoided” (Thomas E. Graham<\/a>, The National Interest October 23, 2024).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The National Interest, a prominent US think-tank, has raised in a timely fashion the critical issue of how to coexist with Russia after the Ukraine conflict: starting with “Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia has long been perceived as a significant military threat, but its recent failures, especially in Ukraine, reveal a weaker reality. Despite bluster and aggressive […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1113,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[192],"tags":[77,26,60],"class_list":["post-1112","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-blog","tag-nato-2","tag-rossija","tag-ssha"],"yoast_head":"\nNATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The National Interest, a prominent US think-tank, has raised in a timely fashion the critical issue of how to coexist with Russia after the Ukraine conflict: starting with "Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia has long been perceived as a significant military threat, but its recent failures, especially in Ukraine, reveal a weaker reality. Despite bluster and aggressive…\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The National Interest, a prominent US think-tank, has raised in a timely fashion the critical issue of how to coexist with Russia after the Ukraine conflict: starting with "Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia has long been perceived as a significant military threat, but its recent failures, especially in Ukraine, reveal a weaker reality. Despite bluster and aggressive…\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ralph Henry Van Deman Institute for Intelligence Studies\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2024-10-28T09:02:29+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2024-10-28T11:16:35+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1280\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"720\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/4837e844aa8bbe54fee9dc8530d81cbc\"},\"headline\":\"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?\",\"datePublished\":\"2024-10-28T09:02:29+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2024-10-28T11:16:35+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":856,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/10\\\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"\u041d\u0410\u0422\u041e\",\"\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f\",\"\u0421\u0428\u0410\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Blog\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/\",\"name\":\"\u041d\u0410\u0422\u041e: \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0436\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435 \u0435\u0451 \u043f\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0434\u044b?! | Ralph Henry Van Deman Institute for Intelligence Studies\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/10\\\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2024-10-28T09:02:29+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2024-10-28T11:16:35+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/10\\\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/10\\\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg\",\"width\":1280,\"height\":720,\"caption\":\"\u041d\u0410\u0422\u041e: \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0436\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435 \u0435\u0451 \u043f\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0434\u044b?!\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/\",\"name\":\"\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0438\u0437\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043a\u0438 \u0420\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0444\u0430 \u0412\u0430\u043d \u0414\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430\",\"description\":\"RHVD Institute for Intelligence Studies\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"RHVD IIS\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0438\u0437\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043a\u0438 \u0420\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0444\u0430 \u0412\u0430\u043d \u0414\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430\",\"alternateName\":\"Ralph Henry Van Deman Institute for Intelligence Studies\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/06\\\/cropped-rhvd_logo.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/06\\\/cropped-rhvd_logo.png\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0438\u0437\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043a\u0438 \u0420\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0444\u0430 \u0412\u0430\u043d \u0414\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/t.me\\\/RHVDIIS\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/4837e844aa8bbe54fee9dc8530d81cbc\",\"name\":\"admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/896abc9e206d84b12e9981d07b5210b8edeec2f8ccdf8badd53f02917e176b39?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/896abc9e206d84b12e9981d07b5210b8edeec2f8ccdf8badd53f02917e176b39?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/896abc9e206d84b12e9981d07b5210b8edeec2f8ccdf8badd53f02917e176b39?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"http:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/\\\/\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/vandeman.org\\\/en\\\/author\\\/admin\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?","description":"The National Interest, a prominent US think-tank, has raised in a timely fashion the critical issue of how to coexist with Russia after the Ukraine conflict: starting with \"Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia has long been perceived as a significant military threat, but its recent failures, especially in Ukraine, reveal a weaker reality. Despite bluster and aggressive…","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"The National Interest, a prominent US think-tank, has raised in a timely fashion the critical issue of how to coexist with Russia after the Ukraine conflict: starting with \"Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia has long been perceived as a significant military threat, but its recent failures, especially in Ukraine, reveal a weaker reality. Despite bluster and aggressive…","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?","og_description":"The National Interest, a prominent US think-tank, has raised in a timely fashion the critical issue of how to coexist with Russia after the Ukraine conflict: starting with \"Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia has long been perceived as a significant military threat, but its recent failures, especially in Ukraine, reveal a weaker reality. Despite bluster and aggressive…","og_url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/","og_site_name":"Ralph Henry Van Deman Institute for Intelligence Studies","article_published_time":"2024-10-28T09:02:29+00:00","article_modified_time":"2024-10-28T11:16:35+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1280,"height":720,"url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/"},"author":{"name":"admin","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/#\/schema\/person\/4837e844aa8bbe54fee9dc8530d81cbc"},"headline":"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?","datePublished":"2024-10-28T09:02:29+00:00","dateModified":"2024-10-28T11:16:35+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/"},"wordCount":856,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg","keywords":["\u041d\u0410\u0422\u041e","\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f","\u0421\u0428\u0410"],"articleSection":["Blog"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/","url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/","name":"\u041d\u0410\u0422\u041e: \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0436\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435 \u0435\u0451 \u043f\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0434\u044b?! | Ralph Henry Van Deman Institute for Intelligence Studies","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg","datePublished":"2024-10-28T09:02:29+00:00","dateModified":"2024-10-28T11:16:35+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/photo_2024-10-28_10-55-07.jpg","width":1280,"height":720,"caption":"\u041d\u0410\u0422\u041e: \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0436\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435 \u0435\u0451 \u043f\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0434\u044b?!"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/nato-chto-zhe-delat-s-rossiej-posle-ejo-pobedy\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"NATO: Which is the best stance on Russia following its win?"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/#website","url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/","name":"\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0438\u0437\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043a\u0438 \u0420\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0444\u0430 \u0412\u0430\u043d \u0414\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430","description":"RHVD Institute for Intelligence Studies","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/#organization"},"alternateName":"RHVD IIS","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/#organization","name":"\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0438\u0437\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043a\u0438 \u0420\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0444\u0430 \u0412\u0430\u043d \u0414\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430","alternateName":"Ralph Henry Van Deman Institute for Intelligence Studies","url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/cropped-rhvd_logo.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/cropped-rhvd_logo.png","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0438\u0437\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043a\u0438 \u0420\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0444\u0430 \u0412\u0430\u043d \u0414\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/t.me\/RHVDIIS"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/#\/schema\/person\/4837e844aa8bbe54fee9dc8530d81cbc","name":"admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/896abc9e206d84b12e9981d07b5210b8edeec2f8ccdf8badd53f02917e176b39?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/896abc9e206d84b12e9981d07b5210b8edeec2f8ccdf8badd53f02917e176b39?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/896abc9e206d84b12e9981d07b5210b8edeec2f8ccdf8badd53f02917e176b39?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"admin"},"sameAs":["http:\/\/vandeman.org\/\/"],"url":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/author\/admin\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1112","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1112"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1112\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1114,"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1112\/revisions\/1114"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1113"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1112"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1112"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vandeman.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1112"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}